The Economic Analysis of Regulation:
A Response to the Critics
Robert W Hahnt
Several legal scholars are highly skeptical of the use of costbenefit analysis and other economic tools in regulatory decisionmaking. Recently, these critics have focused on debunking economic summaries of regulatory activity-sometimes referred to as regulatory
scorecards. The critics generally offer arguments that would support
less quantitative economic analysis of regulations.
This Article addresses the analytical concerns raised by the critics.
It makes the following four points: first, summary measures of the impacts of regulation have made important contributions to our understanding of the regulatory process, a point often overlooked by the
critics; second, some of the suggestions made by the critics are legitimate, but many are not; third, many of the critics' concerns could be
addressed by making refinements to scorecards rather than wholly rejecting them as an analytical tool; and finally, the solution to legitimate
concerns raised by the critics is not to eliminate quantitative economic
analysis, but to gain a deeper understanding of its strengths and weaknesses, and to use it wisely.
Over the past several decades, there have been numerous critiques of the application of economic approaches to problems in public policy. There have also been a number of defenses of quantitative
approaches to analyzing important public policy issues. For example,
Professor Sunstein, in his book Risk and Reason, argues for an approach that would weigh the costs and benefits of different policies,
but also consider a number of other factors.'
The application of economic principles to problems in regulation
has created a veritable firestorm in some parts of the legal community.
The debate has been particularly strident in the area of environmental, health, and safety regulation. According to government estimates, the costs associated with this regulation are substantial-on the
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order of $200 billion for all social regulation and $40 billion for major
federal regulations alone.2 The benefits, which are harder to pin down,
may be even larger. Thus, making small or large changes in the regulatory apparatus could have significant implications for the public's
health and welfare.
One particularly controversial approach that scholars have used
gain
insight into the general impact of regulation is scorecards.
to
These scorecards typically attempt to summarize the impact of different regulations based on a number of indicators, including costs, benefits, cost savings, lives or life-years saved, cost-effectiveness, and net
benefits. In an important early article applying economic principles to
regulatory analysis, John Morrall suggested that the cost-effectiveness
of regulation-measured by the cost per life saved-varied over several orders of magnitude, ranging from $100,000 per life saved for
steering column protection regulation to $72 billion per life saved for
formaldehyde regulation.' More recent work by Tammy Tengs and
others, still finding vast disparities in the cost-effectiveness of lifesaving interventions, argues for a reallocation of resources to maximize regulatory efficiency.'
The range of cost-effectiveness across different investments in
life-saving activities and reductions in mortality risk could have important implications for public policy. In terms of the number of lives
likely to be saved, huge differences arise when the government mandates reductions in radiation exposure on X-ray equipment ($23,000
per life-year saved) as compared with mandating radiation emission
control at uranium fuel cycle facilities ($34 billion per life-year
saved),' or when the government institutes a mandatory seat belt use
law ($69 per life-year saved) versus requiring airbag installation in
cars ($120,000 per life-year saved). In some cases, the government can
and does advocate several different life-saving investments. But because such investments are frequently expensive and resources are
limited, regulations must be prioritized. In another seminal study,
Tammy Tengs and John Graham illustrate the possible gains from prioritizing expenditures. They show that changing the mix of life-saving

2
See Office of Management and Budget (OMB), Report to Congress on the Costs and
Benefits of Federal Regulations (Sept 30, 1997), online at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb
inforeg/rcongress.html (visited May 6,2004).
3
John F Morrall III, A Review of the Record, 10 Regulation 25,29-34 & table 4 (Nov-Dec
1986). Morrall noted that "[t]he most obvious implication of these figures is that the range of
cost-effectiveness among rules is enormous." Id at 31.
4
See Tammy 0. Tengs, et al, Five-Hundred Life-Saving Interventions and Their CostEffectiveness, 15 Risk Analysis 369,371-72 (1995).
5 Id at 377.
6
Id at 371.
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investments to maximize efficiency could save thousands of additional
lives at no additional cost
In related work, I assembled and analyzed the most comprehensive set of federal regulations to date.8 Using the data contained in the
government's own regulatory analyses, I found results similar to Tengs,
Graham, and Morrall: cost-effectiveness varied over several orders of
magnitude. In a calculation similar to Tengs and Graham's, I argued
that reallocating funding to life-saving alternatives in developing
countries could save substantially more lives at the same or lower
cost.9 In addition, I found that the total benefits associated with the
regulations examined exceeded the total costs. Perhaps my most controversial finding, at least the one hardest for the critics to accept, was
that a substantial number of regulations, based on the government's
numbers, would not pass an economist's strict cost-benefit test.
In recent work, Richard Parker argues that the regulatory scorecards that I and others have used are deeply flawed and should be
abandoned." He analyzes the work of Morrall, Tengs, Graham, myself,
and others and argues that it has serious deficiencies. In this Article, I
respond to Parker's criticisms, and examine some general critiques of
the economic analysis of social regulation. While the arguments advanced by some of the critics have some validity, scorecard analysis
has yielded important research and policy insights, and has also led to
more efficient regulation. Even if they have pointed out oversights in
scorecard analysis, the critics have failed to propose a preferable replacement. The solution to the legitimate concerns raised by the critics
is not to eliminate quantitative analysis, but to gain a deeper understanding of its strengths and weaknesses, and to use it wisely.
This Article is organized as follows: Part I provides a review of
the main critiques aimed at the alleged misuse or abuse of regulatory
scorecards and economics in assessing the impact of environmental,

7
See Tammy 0. Tengs and John D. Graham, The Opportunity Costs of HaphazardSocial
Investments in Life-Saving, in Robert W. Hahn, ed, Risks, Costs, and Lives Saved: Getting Better
Results from Regulation 167, 177 (Oxford 1996) (concluding that retaining the present allocation
of investments in life-saving interventions results in the loss of life-saving potential amounting to
$31.1 billion, 636,000 life-years, or 60,200 lives every year).
8
See Robert W. Hahn, Reviving Regulatory Reform: A Global Perspective 32-64 (AEIBrookings 2000) (Government Numbers II) (evaluating 168 final and proposed government rules
where Regulatory Impact Analyses were performed, and concluding that "society could spend its
regulatory dollars more wisely"). Within the text of this piece, "the study" refers to chapter 3 in
Government Numbers II.
9 See Robert W. Hahn, Regulatory Reform: What Do the Government's Numbers Tell Us?
(Government Numbers I), in Hahn, ed, Risks Costs; and Lives Saved 208, 235-38 (cited in note 7)
(contending that investing a dollar in a life-saving activity in developing countries yields returns
of 30 to 1,500 times that received from spending a dollar on the average federal regulation).
10 See Richard W. Parker, Grading the Government, 70 U Chi L Rev 1345, 1356 (2003)
("Scorecards cannot be salvaged. They should simply be abandoned.").
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health, and safety regulation. Part II responds to criticism of my own
work and provides a comprehensive examination of the government's
regulatory impact assessments. Part III identifies some of the key contributions that regulatory scorecards and economic analysis have
made to our understanding of policies and regulations."
I. A REVIEW OF THE MAIN CRITIQUES

In this Part, I summarize many major criticisms of scorecards and
related work that have been made by a group of legal scholars including Thomas McGarity, Lisa Heinzerling, and, more recently, Richard
Parker (collectively, the "critics")."
I will primarily consider critiques that are directed at five papers
(the "main studies"). These studies are a paper by John Morrall that
presents a famous table on the cost-effectiveness of regulations measured in cost per life saved;" a paper by Tammy Tengs et al that examines the cost-effectiveness of life-saving interventions in the United
States from publicly available economic analyses;" a paper by Tammy
Tengs and John Graham that used the data from the earlier Tengs et al
study to assess the opportunity costs of social investments in lifesaving;" and two of my own studies that assemble information on the
costs and benefits of regulation based on government Regulatory Impact Analyses (RIAs)."
These papers are all influential studies that have used regulatory
scorecards to characterize regulation. I will define a scorecard more
broadly than Parker, who, in his article, primarily considers summary
statistics on the net benefits and cost-effectiveness of regulations. He
views what he considers to be scorecards as the "leading source of
regulatory skepticism" and the main source for the "remarkable ascendancy of the anti-regulatory movement." Parker also claims that
researchers creating scorecards treat RIAs as final declarations of
costs and benefits." This characterization is unduly narrow and incor11 For a more extensive discussion of the issues raised in this Article, see Robert W. Hahn,
In Defense of the Economic Analysis of Regulation (forthcoming AEI-Brookings 2004).
12 See Thomas 0. McGarity, Reinventing Rationality:The Role of Regulatory Analysis in the
Federal Bureaucracy (Cambridge 1991); Lisa Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions, 107 Yale L J 1981, 2070 (1998); Parker, 70 U Chi L Rev at 1345 (cited in note 10).
13 Morrall, 10 Regulation at 31 & table 4 (cited in note 3).
14
Tengs, et al, 15 Risk Analysis at 371-72 (cited in note 4).
15 Tengs and Graham, Opportunity Costs at 177 (cited in note 7).
16
Hahn, Government Numbers H at 32-64 (cited in note 8); Hahn, Government Numbers I
at 208-53 (cited in note 9). For a description of RIAs, see OMB,Draft 2003 Report to Congress
on the Costs and Benefits of FederalRegulations, 68 Fed Reg 5492,5513-27 (Feb 3, 2003) (OMB
Draft Report).
17 Parker, 70 U Chi L Rev at 1347-48 (cited in note 10).
18 See id at 1404 (arguing instead that "launching a regulation marks the beginning of an
exploration of a territory that is scientifically and economically unknown").
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rect. Scorecards are not simply summary statistics, and are neither

anti-regulatory tools nor final declarations. Moreover, as shown below,
scorecards can reveal weaknesses in an agency's analysis and potential
areas for improvement, thus improving the regulatory process and net
worth of regulations overall.'
A scorecard can be either an accounting framework or a description of summary statistics that help shed light on the measurement of
the costs, benefits, or costs and benefits of a regulation or several regulations. Thus, a scorecard does not need to be a table or a scorecard in

the traditional sense, though a tabular presentation of some sort is
typical. For example, A. Myrick Freeman provides summary statistics
on the costs and benefits of environmental regulation. Thomas Hopkins provides a summary table on the costs of regulation. John Hird
and I did a study on the costs and benefits of regulation with tables
that tally up benefits and costs." And Cass Sunstein and I offer a
model scorecard for evaluating individual regulations that could aid

government and citizens in understanding the impact of regulations."

The point is that scorecards consider a range of output measures,
including net benefits and quality indicators, such as whether an RIA
quantitatively assessed alternatives and included certain information

in its executive summary. The critics have focused on only those scorecards suggesting that significant numbers of federal regulations fail a
cost-benefit test, though that certainly does not encompass the universe of regulatory scorecards.4
Many of the analyses of scorecards offered by the critics would
have the substantive effect of making regulations look more favorable
19 Indeed, Parker himself cannot sustain this overly aggressive argument; in the end, his
challenge is primarily methodological: "Of course, scorecardists cannot be expected to factor into
their analysis information of which regulatory evaluators are themselves unaware ... . The culpability of scorecards is [not] found []in their failure to detect previously unidentified costs and
benefits." Id at 1405.
20 See A. Myrick Freeman III, Environmental Policy since Earth Day I: What Have We
Gained?, 16 J Econ Persp 125, 146 (Winter 2002). See also Sunstein, Risk and Reason at 240-43
(cited in note 1) (comparing the costs and benefits of EPA's ozone and particulates regulation).
21 See Thomas D. Hopkins, The Costs of FederalRegulation: Draft 11 & table 1 (National
Chamber Foundation 1992) (summarizing the annual costs of new social regulation).
22 See Robert W. Hahn and John A. Hird, The Costs and Benefits of Regulation:Review and
Synthesis, 8 Yale J Reg 233, 256 (1990) (comparing dollar costs and benefits of drug, highway
safety, and other types of regulations in table format). See also Murray L. Weidenbaum and
Robert DeFina, The Cost of FederalRegulation of Economic Activity 2 & table 1 (AEI 1978)
(summarizing the annual cost of federal regulation by regulated area, including administrative
and compliance costs); Robert E. Litan and William D. Nordhaus, Reforming FederalRegulation
11, 8-33 (Yale 1983) (summarizing costs and benefits of federal regulatory schemes such as traffic safety and emissions standards).
23 See Robert W. Hahn and Cass R. Sunstein, A New Executive Orderfor Improving Federal Regulation? Deeperand Wider Cost-Benefit Analysis, 150 U Pa L Rev 1489,1519-20 (2002).
24
See, for example, Hahn, Government Numbers II at 62 (cited in note 8) (examining how
well federal agencies evaluate economic efficiency of regulations prior to enacting).
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in light of a cost-benefit test. I consider five general critiques of score-

cards below.
Discounting Benefits

A.

The discount rate is critical in cost-benefit analysis. Economists
use discounting to make costs and benefits that occur in different time
periods comparable. The basic rationale for discounting is that consumers are not indifferent between consuming a dollar's worth of a
good today and one dollar next year; discount rates are necessary to
reflect this preference.
The critics generally suggest using lower discount rates than the
rate generally accepted and used in practice. Parker, for example, objects to my choice of a 5 percent discount rate in my base-case analysis
of regulations (with a range of 3 percent to 7 percent in the sensitivity
analysis).n He suggests that the range should be 2 percent to 3 percent. Lower discount rates would generally have the effect of raising
the level of benefits in comparison to costs, thus making regulation
look more favorable than it otherwise would.
There is no general agreement on the correct choice for a discount rate; there is, however, a great deal of support in practice for the
range of numbers I used. Economic guidance issued by the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) during the Clinton administration
recommended a discount rate of 7 percent. 7 This rate is an approximation of the opportunity cost of capital, that is, the before-tax rate of return to incremental private investment, which is currently estimated to
be 7 percent in real terms. Guidance from OMB during the second
Bush administration suggests using discount rates ranging from 3 percent to 7 percent.2
Some critics would go further, arguing that discounting at all is
wrong when considering environmental, health, and safety policies because of both moral considerations (placing a present and future value
on life) and the incompatibility of discounting with these types of
See Parker, 70 U Chi L Rev at 1370 (cited in note 10).
Id at 1373 (supporting a 2 to 3 percent discount rate based on the consumption rate of
interest, which some economists use for discounting future benefits to consumers).
See OMB, Economic Analysis of Federal Regulations under Executive Order 12866
27
§ III.A.3 (Jan 11, 1996) (1996 Best Practices Guidelines), online at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
omb/inforeg/riaguide.htmi (visited May 6,2004) (explaining the rationale for discounting to present value in cost-benefit analyses, and estimating a 7 percent discount rate).
28 See OMB, Informing Regulatory Decisions: 2003 Report to Congress on the Costs and
Benefits of FederalRegulations and Unfunded Mandates on State, Local, and Tribal Entities 118,
150-51 (OMB 2003 Report), online at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/2003-costbenfinal-rpt.pdf (visited May 6,2004) (replacing the 1996 Best Practices Guidelines to establish
a real discount rate of 7 percent and a social or consumer discount rate of 3 percent, and counseling agencies to use both 3 and 7 percent discount rates in cost-benefit analyses).
25

26
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regulations.' 9 Not discounting lives or benefit streams, however, creates
problems. If lives are not discounted, then policy planners are effectively indifferent between a life saved today and a life saved tomorrow. Thus, if costs were discounted at some positive rate, it would pay

to defer investments in life-saving indefinitely-an unreasonable
policy.
In short, the critics' case for not discounting is not compelling.
Using a discount rate to discount future benefits and costs is a justified and widely accepted component of economic analysis. The rates
used in my studies are within the generally accepted range.
B.

Anti-regulatory Bias

The critics have claimed that many scorecards demonstrate an
anti-regulatory bias. They suggest that there is a selection bias in certain scorecards that excludes from the analysis possible new or exist-

ing regulations that are likely to be cost-effective or pass a costbenefit test."
Morrall's research provides a notable refutation of this criticism.

In a recent draft paper that responds persuasively to an attack by
Heinzerling, Morrall suggests new regulatory opportunities that are
both socially beneficial and attractive from an efficiency standpoint."
Moreover, OMB, where Morrall is a senior economist, has recently
been at the forefront of identifying potential cost-effective regulatory

29
See, for example, Frank Ackerman and Lisa Heinzerling, Pricing the Priceless: CostBenefit Analysis of Environmental Protection,150 U Pa L Rev 1553, 1570-73 (2002) (arguing
against discounting in cost-benefit analyses of environmental regulations because the benefits of
such regulations extend far into the future and discounting makes far-in-the-future catastrophes
appear trivial, and because these analyses assume stable problems where environmental problems are subject to crises). See also Sidney A. Shapiro and Robert L. Glicksman, Risk Regulation
at Risk: Restoring a PragmaticApproach 118-19 (Stanford 2003) (criticizing the use of discount
rates in cost-benefit analyses of regulations as empirically questionable, causing most risk regulation to appear unreasonable, and ignoring non-economic social goals achieved by regulations).
30 See, for example, Parker, 70 U Chi L Rev at 1363-65 (cited in note 10) (documenting
regulations not included in Morrall's table where benefits exceeded costs); Heinzerling, 107 Yale
L J at 2014-17 (cited in note 12) (same).
31 See John F. Morrall III, Saving Lives: A Review of the Record 16-17, 25 (working
paper 03-6 AEI-Brookings, 2003), online at http://www.aei.brookings.orglpublications/
abstract.php?pid=354 (visited May 6, 2004) (listing several new regulatory opportunities that
cost-benefit analyses indicate are life-saving). Table 3 in Morrall's paper directly responds to
concerns raised by the critics by listing several regulatory opportunities:

In 1999, the FDA proposed to reduce the intake of trans fatty acids by requiring labeling.... In 2003, FDA proposed requiring bar codes for drugs and biologic products. OMB
also sent a prompt letter to OSHA to promote [automated external defibrillators] in the
workplace. A fourth suggestion is to promote the increased intake of omega-3 fatty acids,
which are found primarily in dark meat fish.
Id at 16-17.
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opportunities,2 further demonstrating that scorecards have not created an anti-regulatory bias within the government.
The same argument applies to the research by Tengs et al and
myself. The 1995 Tengs et al analysis of five hundred regulations was
an ambitious attempt to synthesize the cost-effectiveness of regulations and other life-saving interventions.33 While Parker criticizes the
selection methodology for this study, he does not propose a viable alternative to the objective criteria used by Tengs et al, and indeed admits that finding an alternative is a "difficult enterprise."'3 Similarly,
my studies reflect an attempt to systematize knowledge by analyzing
regulations for which RIAs were performed." Parker criticizes this
work for focusing only on so-called major rules, or significant regulatory actions, and asserts that proposed or actual minor rules would
have been more cost-effective, finding an "in-built sampling bias
against regulation" in my data."
We do not know, however, whether including minor rules in this
analysis would have shown regulations to be more cost-effective, because data are not yet available to analyze this problem.37 Moreover,
minor rules are not subject to the same level of OMB scrutiny as maj or rules. Thus, there is less incentive for an agency to pay attention to
net costs and benefits of these regulations than there might be for major rules. Significantly, regulatory agencies often prefer their rules not
to be deemed major so that they do not have to undergo White House
review. Thus, the selection bias could easily cut the other way -minor
rules could be less cost-effective-and Parker provides no data to
support his speculation to the contrary.
Another potential bias arises because agencies may tend to overstate benefits and understate costs in order to make their regulations
pass cost-benefit tests and OMB reviews. This type of bias, ignored by
the critics, would be pro-regulatory, not anti-regulatory. Justice Breyer,
for example, characterizes agencies as having "tunnel vision, a 'classic
administrative disease' [that] arises when an agency so organizes or
subdivides its tasks that each employee's individual conscientious per32

See id at 16.

See Tengs, et al, 15 Risk Analysis at 369 (cited in note 4).
Parker, 70 U Chi L Rev at 1365-66 (cited in note 10). Parker concedes that Tengs used
objective criteria in gathering the sample so as to avoid selection bias, but nonetheless Parker
criticizes the sample for being biased because published studies (on which Tengs relied) will always contain extreme results in order to be interesting enough to be publishable. Parker himself,
however, contributes to the problem by publishing an "extreme" view.
35
See generally Hahn, Government Numbers 1H (cited in note 8).
36 See Parker, 70 U Chi L Rev at 1364 (cited in note 10).
37 Indeed, Parker himself concedes that "it is [ ] difficult to determine, in Hahn's case, the
direction of the selection bias, much less the magnitude." Id at 1364 n 67. While Parker suggests
that minor regulations are likely more cost-effective, he presents no evidence to support this
33

34

contention.
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formance effectively carries single-minded pursuit of a single goal too
far, to the point where it brings about more harm than good."" "Tunnel vision" not only drives agencies to go the last costly mile, but it can
also cause them to defend their regulations by reporting additional
benefits and ignoring costs.
Even if there were biases in the studies examined by the critics,
this line of research has made important contributions. Prior to Morrall's table on differences in cost-effectiveness among regulations, no
systematic database on the cost-effectiveness of federal regulations
existed. 39 Even if important potential or final regulations were missing,
this database serves as a basis for developing the knowledge needed
to address the concerns raised by the critics. Thus, even if the critics
were correct, the solution would be to address the biases, not stop the
research.
C. Use of Ex Ante Estimates
The main studies addressed by the critics all use prospective, or
ex ante, measures of costs and benefits. Some critics have argued that
ex ante measures may be misleading because they may overstate actual costs, understate actual benefits, or both." The critics assert that
this is a problem because the actual net benefits of a policy could differ markedly from the estimated net benefits known to policymakers
before the policy is put in place.'
While this is true, policymakers do not have a measure of ex post
benefits or cost savings when policies are actually implemented.'2 Indeed, there is no obvious alternative at this point to using the ex ante
studies, though it may be possible to improve their reliability in the
future.
D. Qualitative Benefits
A general concern voiced by critics is that quantitative analysis
dominates and drowns out important qualitative issues, primarily unquantified or unquantifiable benefits." This criticism is misguided be38 See Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circleat 11 (cited in note 1).
Morrall, 10 Regulation at 30 (cited in note 3).
See, for example, Parker, 70 U Chi L Rev at 1367-70 (cited in note 10).
41 Id.
42
Id at 1370.
43
See, for example, Ackerman and Heinzerling, 150 U Pa L Rev at 1562-70 (cited in note
29). Parker also expresses concern about cost omissions in regulatory scorecards, contending that
omitting costs that are unquantified or unquantifiable makes scorecards' utility suspect. Parker,
70 U Chi L Rev at 1404 (cited in note 10). I am also concerned about omissions of costs and
benefits, but do not feel that is a reason not to have good quantitative analysis inform the decisionmaking process. Furthermore, contrary to Parker's assertion, different types of scorecards
can account for unquantified benefits and costs.
39
40
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cause the primary purpose of the main studies was not to address key
qualitative factors in cost-benefit analysis, and because many of the
more recent studies indeed do integrate qualitative considerations in
evaluating the efficacy of regulations.
In my studies, I accounted for several factors other than the number of regulations that pass or fail a cost-benefit test, including the
quality of agency analysis," but Parker ignores this constructive application in his critique. Moreover, the early studies that did not address
qualitative considerations gave rise to subsequent research that addresses both qualitative and quantitative aspects of regulation using
scorecards. 5 Parker's critique ignores the fact that these and other
scorecards can be used in ways to help make the very points about
qualitative considerations that the critics care so much about. A researcher could, for example, add a column to Morrall's famous table
that specifies important qualitative factors that should also be considered in reaching a decision.
Heinzerling and Ackerman would go further than Parker. They
argue that because cost-benefit analysis is time- and resourceintensive, it is not "useful to keep cost-benefit analysis around as a
kind of regulatory tag-along."' However, they do not present data to
suggest an alternative to cost-benefit analysis that could improve
regulatory outcomes or the regulatory process. And they ignore research suggesting that cost-benefit analyses of regulations have been
helpful in certain circumstances. 7 In sum, while the early studies focused primarily on quantitative factors, later work that builds upon
the early cost-benefit analyses also includes qualitative factors.
E.

Robustness of Results

The critics are quite skeptical of some of the findings in the main
studies and suggest that reanalysis of the data could lead to different
conclusions. For example, Heinzerling is very critical of some of Mor-

44 See, for example, Hahn, Government Numbers 11 at 36 table 3-1, 62 table 3-11 (cited in
note 8). Table 3-11 is an example of a scorecard, ignored by the critics, which reveals the quality
of agencies' analysis efforts by characterizing agencies' analyses of regulations as "partial" where
they do not include comprehensive or complete estimates of benefits and costs.
45 See generally Robert W. Hahn, et al, Assessing Regulatory Impact Analyses: The Failure
ofAgencies to Comply with Executive Order 12,866,23 Harv J L & Pub Pol 859 (2000) (evaluating the quality of agency RIAs on the basis of compliance with Executive Order 12,866, which
sets forth standards for economic analysis of costs and benefits of regulations, and suggesting
that the impact of RIAs has fallen short of the expectations of regulatory reform advocates in
part because agencies do not fully comply with these guidelines). See also Part Ill.
46 Ackerman and Heinzerling, 150 U Pa L Rev at 1583 (cited in note 29).
47 For examples of such beneficial results of cost-benefit analyses of regulations, see generally Richard D. Morgenstern, ed, Economic Analyses at EPA: Assessing Regulatory Impact (Resources for the Future 1997); Morrall, Saving Lives (cited in note 31).
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rail's findings on cost-effectiveness." But Morrall, addressing charges
by Heinzerling and Parker, argues that these critics make numerous
errors in their own analysis that could have been corrected by a competent peer review process. 9 (I will address more fully in the next Part
the charges that the critics direct at my studies.) Concerns about robustness should be taken seriously. Unfortunately, the critics do little
to help resolve these concerns.
F.

The Benefits and Costs to Subgroups

The critics correctly point out that cost-benefit analysis, particularly when using scorecards, frequently glosses over important distributional issues."' If the necessary information were available, there is
no reason, in principle, that cost-benefit analysis could not address
such equity issues. Given information regarding the impact of a regulation on different income groups, for example, it might be possible to
develop a more individualized assessment of whether the regulation
hurts or helps these groups.
The basic problem, however, is that such information is generally
unavailable. Most of the RIAs I have reviewed do not collect useful
information on the distributional impacts of a regulatory policy. In addition, obtaining good information on the distributional effects of
most regulations would be expensive.
II.

CRITICISMS OF THE GOVERNMENT NUMBERS STUDIES

This Part reviews criticisms leveled at two of my studies addressing what the government's RIAs reveal about the benefits and costs of
regulations. Although the critics have raised legitimate concerns, they
have overstated their case.
Both studies that use the government's numbers try to summarize
what is known about the costs and benefits of regulation, taking the
government's numbers as the primary source of information. The government's numbers are often the result of incomplete- and frequently
flawed -analysis. Nevertheless, the RIAs are the only available source
of data on which we can base a comprehensive review of major federal regulations. Because the results from the later study are more
48 See Heinzerling, 107 Yale L J at 1998 (cited in note 12) (finding "Morrall's estimates of
costs per life saved are far higher-sometimes orders of magnitude higher-than the agencies'
estimates of such costs").
49 Parker suggests that Morrall alters agency estimates without acknowledging that he is
doing so. See Parker, 70 U Chi L Rev at 1359 & n 47 (cited in note 10). For Morrall's response to
Parker's allegation, see Morrall, Saving Lives at 9 (cited in note 31) ("[Parker] arrives at this
conclusion, which is contrary to what is stated in the article, after a phone conversation.").
50
See, for example, McGarity, Reinventing Rationality at 152-53 (cited in note 12); Parker,
70 U Chi L Rev at 1407-09 (cited in note 10).
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comprehensive than those of my earlier study, it is the focus of this
Part.
My assessment of the government's numbers yielded several conclusions. First, aggregate estimates of agency net benefits based on the
government's numbers are positive. Second, the government can increase the net benefits of regulation. Less than half of the rules examined would pass a neutral economist's cost-benefit test; thus net benefits would increase substantially if agencies rejected such rules. Third,
net benefits span a wide range, which suggests that a reallocation
of regulatory resources could increase the aggregate net benefits of
regulation.
Upon reassessment of these findings several years later, I am still
in complete agreement with all of these conclusions, except the statement that "[1]ess than half the rules pass a neutral economist's costbenefit test." For that finding, for the reasons discussed below, I suggest a suitable refinement is that a significant fraction of regulations
would fail a cost-benefit test; my best estimate is that about half of the
regulations would pass such a test and half would fail. 1 I group criticisms of the study into three categories: benefits and costs, benefits,
and costs. I use sensitivity analyses to address those claims that can be
addressed with quantitative analysis.
Benefits and Costs

A.

There are two general critiques of the study related to net benefit
calculations: a suggestion that the standardization of assumptions introduced biases that reduced net benefits, and concerns about the
study's treatment of uncertainty.
1. Standardization introduces biases.
The rationale for standardizing assumptions was to have a relatively simple way of comparing benefits and costs across regulations.
So, I chose to standardize a number of values including the discount
rate, the value of a statistical life, the value of fixed amounts of emission reductions, and the value of reducing certain injuries.
There are several critiques related to standardization. First,
Parker suggests that I introduced standardized assumptions, making
This result applies to final regulations. This analysis is consistent with a more recent
analysis finding that about 58 percent of regulations aimed specifically at saving lives would not
pass a cost-benefit analysis. See generally Robert W. Hahn, Randall W. Lutter, and W. Kip Viscusi, Do Federal Regulations Reduce Mortality? 21 (AEI-Brookings 2000). See also Robert W.
Hahn, Rohit Malik, and Patrick M. Dudley, Reviewing the Government's Numbers on Regulation
(Related Publication 04-03 AEI-Brookings 2004), online at http://www.aei-brookings.org/admin/
authorpdfs/page.php?id=321 (visited May 6,2004) (providing tables showing the impact of adding non-standard benefits on the percentage of rules that would pass a cost-benefit test).
51
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''numerous adjustments to those numbers-usually in the direction of
higher costs and lower benefits," and asserts that these assumptions
resulted in a skew against regulations.7 This is simply false, and Parker
provides no data to support his position. None of these assumptions
was made to make the analysis come out in a particular way, but
rather as a matter of standard economic practice.
There also seems to be some confusion about my treatment of inflation and my choice of a base year. 3 For example, Parker suggests
that I do not account for inflation after 1990. This is simply incorrect. I
converted all dollars to 1995 dollars using the consumer price index."
Further, I needed to choose a base year to make the regulations comparable. Parker highlights the fact that this choice was "arbitrary."'5
While it is true that the selection of a base year or particular vantage
point in time, like the choice of a uniform dollar year, can affect the
results, it does not affect the key conclusions. The choice of a base year
does not affect the conclusions about the number of regulations that
pass a cost-benefit test. Varying the base year changes the factor by
which you discount net benefits to their present value, not the sign. If
the present value of net benefits is positive for a particular base year,
then it will still be positive if that base year is moved forward or
backward in time.
2. Treatment of uncertainty could be improved.
There are two major concerns about uncertainty: first, that there
is false precision in the reporting of the numbers, and second, that the
study often uses midpoint estimates to describe the most likely value
without considering the range or another value the agency may state
as plausible. Parker makes a valid point about false precision. 6 In retrospect, I should have reported fewer significant digits in my findings
to better reflect the uncertainty in my results."
Parker's problem with my use of midpoints for best estimates
when ranges are provided is less persuasive. He suggests that one mistake I made was in assigning a midpoint where the agency preferred a
higher or lower part of the range." Using the midpoint for the best es52

See Parker, 70 U Chi L Rev at 1361 (cited in note 10).

53 See id.
54 Hahn, Government Numbers II at 40 (cited in note 8).
55 Parker, 70 U Chi L Rev at 1361 (cited in note 10).
56 See id at 1409 & n 234 (criticizing the studies for presenting precise estimates of benefits
in a way that masks the uncertain nature of these numbers).
57 Rounding to two significant digits is probably reasonable.
58 Parker criticizes this practice, using the "Great Lakes Water Quality Guidance" as an
example. See Parker, 70 U Chi L Rev at 1394-96 (cited in note 10); Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA), Final Water Quality Guidance for the Great Lakes System, 60 Fed Reg 15366
(1995). While that RIA suggests that EPA expected annual costs to be at the lower end of the
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timate is consistent and easy to understand. In addition, taking the
midpoint of the range is not inherently biased in either direction.
In order to account for uncertainty in benefits and costs, I simulated a sensitivity analysis using different values for benefits and costs.
Table 1 reveals the impact of varying benefits and costs on three costbenefit measures and illustrates that variations in the estimates of
costs and benefits do not affect the key conclusions. This demonstrates
that Parker's criticism, while well-taken, is irrelevant to the conclusions of the study. Using the low, mid, or high point of the ranges does
not markedly change the conclusions.
TABLE 1

The Impact of Varying Benefits and Costs (n=106)
Scenario

Results

Base Case

High
Benefits
and
Low Costs

Very High
Benefits
and Very
Low Costs

1100

1800

2400

3100

38%

40%

43%

44%

48%

-470

-370

-280

-190

-110

Very Low
Benefits
and Very
High Costs

Low
Benefits
and High
Costs

Aggregate
Net Benefits

490

Percentage
that Pass a
B/C Test
Aggregate
Net Benefits
of Rules that
Fail a B/C
Test

Table 1 Notes: Net Benefits are in billions of 1995 dollars. Numbers are rounded to
two significant digits.
Very Low Benefits means that benefits are 50% of the base case; Low Benefits means
that benefits are 75% of the base case; High Benefits means that benefits are 125% of
the base case; Very High Benefits means that benefits are 150% of the base case. The
same measures also apply to costs.

The first row of the table shows that aggregate net benefits remain positive and substantial under all variations of benefits and costs.
The second row of the table illustrates that under all three variations,
the percentage of final regulations that pass a cost-benefit test rerange rather than at the upper end, it does not specify a best estimate. See id at 15381.
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mains below 50 percent. The third row of the table reveals that the ag-

gregate net benefits for the set of final regulations that fail a costbenefit test are substantially negative for all ranges of benefits and
costs. This table demonstrates that altering the methodology in response to Parker's criticisms does not alter the fundamental conclusions of the analysis.
3. An analytical response to the critique on benefits and costs.
This Part provides some quantitative information on the various
critiques, including variations in the value of a statistical life (VSL)
and the discount rate. Table 2 shows the fraction of regulations that
pass a cost-benefit test based on the quantifiable benefits and costs.
TABLE 2
The Impact of Varying the Value of Statistical Life and the Discount

Rate on Regulations Passing a Benefit-Cost Test (n=106)
Discount Rate

1%

3%

5%

7%

9%

$lm

38%

38%

37%

36%

35%

$3m

41%

41%

41%

40%

40%

VSL $5m

43%

43%

43%

42%

42%

$7m

43%

43%

43%

42%

42%

$9m

45%

45%

43%

42%

42%

Table 2 Notes: VSL is in millions of 1994 dollars.

The table reveals that in the base case, 43 percent of the 106 regulations pass a cost-benefit test. The fraction of regulations that pass
such a test ranges between 35 percent and 45 percent, depending on
the scenario. Logically, as the VSL increases and the discount rate decreases, more regulations pass a cost-benefit test. Even under the most
favorable of assumptions (higher VSL and lower discount rate), less
than half of the regulations pass a cost-benefit test.
B.

Benefits
There are two general critiques of my work on benefits: that
many rules that are likely to have positive benefits are assigned zero
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benefits, and that the value of a statistical life used in the study is too
low."
1. The zero benefits critique.
Parker finds it problematic that I assign a zero benefit to some
regulations for which the agency narrates some benefits, but does not
quantify any.6° In that part of the study, however, I was interested in
quantifying and monetizing those benefits and costs that could reasonably be quantified and monetized.
Yet Parker makes the "startling discovery" that 41 of the 136
6
regulations in the database are assigned a zero benefit. ' Since I note
in the regulatory scorecard that agencies monetized benefits for only
26 percent of all rules between 1981 and 1996,' Parker should not be
surprised to find that some regulations are assigned zero benefits.
As I note in the study, I went to some lengths to monetize quantities, particularlyon the benefit side, where an agency had not done so.
Of the 136 final and proposed regulations considered in my net benefits calculations, the agencies themselves monetized benefits for only
35 regulations. In my final results, I monetize benefits for another 62
regulations that the agency did not. Therefore, a total of 97 regulations
have monetized benefits in my database.
Parker claims that the study assigns a zero value to any benefit
not quantified and monetized by the agency, with a few exceptions.,'
However, monetizing benefits for 62 regulations that the agency did
not monetize is not indicative of "a few exceptions." In fact, I
monetize benefits that the agency did not monetize for approximately
half of all regulations. Moreover, I do not simply "disregard ... whole
'
categories of... benefits," as Parker suggests, but consider them in
three ways. First, as noted above, in the regulatory scorecard, I indicate the number of rules for which the RIAs do not monetize benefits.
Second, I do sensitivity analyses on the benefit and cost numbers to

See Parker, 70 U Chi L Rev at 1370-75,1384-1404 (cited in note 10).
Idat 1383.
61 See id at 1382.
Hahn, Government Numbers IHat 36 table 3-1 (cited in note 8).
62
For many of these 97 regulations, I monetized benefits that the agency quantified but did
63
not monetize. For a demonstration of the negligible analytical impact of including nonstandard
quantified benefits, see also Hahn, Malik, and Dudley, Reviewing the Government's Numbers on
Regulation (cited in note 51).
See Parker, 70 U Chi L Rev at 1382-83 (cited in note 10) ("It turns out that Hahn, with a
64
few narrow and limited exceptions, has assigned a zero value to any benefit which the government's regulatory impact assessment does not quantify and monetize."). See also Shapiro and
Glicksman, Risk Regulation at Risk at 77, 103 (cited in note 29) (critiquing my estimates of the
values of nonmonetized benefits as decreasing net benefit estimates for regulations).
65 Parker, 70 U Chi L Rev at 1381 (cited in note 10).
59

60
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determine the extent to which they affect the basic results. Third, the
study has given rise to subsequent work that focuses on this issue in
more detail. Finally, I make it evident that part of the study focuses on
quantifiable benefits and costs."
A key objection is that I assign a zero benefit to some regulations
for which the agency narrates some benefits but does not quantify
any.6 This is true, but I have never claimed otherwise. Moreover, there
is no simple alternative for filling gaps in an agency's analysis. It might
be useful to do another study focusing on narrated benefits and costs,
but that is not the focus of my study. Moreover, it is relatively easy for
an agency to narrate benefits or costs; it is another matter to quantify
them.
I assign zero benefits to these regulations for lack of a better assumption. Some would argue that zero is a lower bound and can lead
to misleading results. I would argue that this is a matter of interpretation. For example, if a regulation has some quantified costs, and benefits are assigned a zero value, then quantifiable net benefits will be
negative, and the regulation will not pass a cost-benefit test based on
quantifiable net benefits. But the regulation could still pass a more
broadly defined cost-benefit test if nonquantifiable benefits are included in the final decision.
Homeland security regulations provide a good example. So far, it
has been very difficult to quantify the benefits of those regulations.
Nonetheless, I would argue that it is useful to put pressure on the
agency to try to quantify the benefits of those regulations to the extent
feasible to avoid wasteful social expenditures.
In short, I think it is not unreasonable to assign a zero dollar
value to unquantified benefits and cost categories for three reasons.
First, it gives regulatory agencies an incentive to provide more information on quantifiable benefits and costs. Second, any other assumption seems totally arbitrary in the absence of information on the actual non-quantified benefits and costs. Third, the measure of quantifiable net benefits should be used in conjunction with nonquantifiable

See Hahn, Government Numbers IH at 40 (cited in note 8):
All agencies, including the EPA, did not often provide quantified estimates of environmental benefits other than air pollution reduction benefits. My analysis therefore includes
only air pollution reduction benefits. To calculate the total benefits of a rule, I combined the
benefits from health and safety risk reduction with the benefits from air pollution
reduction.
67 Parker also objects that I do not recognize benefits other than reducing the risk of cancer, heart disease, and lead poisoning, and thus assign zero value to regulations that have other
benefits that the agencies quantified. See Parker, 70 U Chi L Rev at 1384-86 (cited in note 10).
As discussed below, recognizing such nonstandard benefits only results in 2 more rules, out of
106, passing the cost-benefit test under most scenarios. See text accompanying notes 77-78.
6
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benefits and costs to reach a decision. Exactly how is a matter of some
debate.
2.

Value of life is too low.

My study uses a VSL of $3 to $7 million with a most likely value
and a
of $5 million. I based this estimate on a review of the literature
of government.6
outside
and
within
experts
economic
with
discussion
Parker suggests that my best estimate and range for VSL are not
appropriate.9 In fact, there are several studies and guidance documents that support my general range. OMB's guidelines during both
the Clinton administration and the current Bush administration support the range used.' A meta-analysis of several studies by Viscusi and

Aldy places the median value at $7 million for a worker in the United
States.'
In Appendix D of his paper, Parker adjusts the VSL to account
for growth in real income and involuntary risks. 2 Parker does not explain how he derives many of his estimates, however, including the ad-

justments for inflation, income growth, and income elasticity of risk 3
The practice of making such adjustments has been reviewed by the
EPA's Science Advisory Board and generally has not been supported
due to uncertainties regarding these adjustments." Thus, while Parker
68 These experts include Al McGartland, Director, National Center for Environmental
Economics, United States Environmental Protection Agency; and W. Kip Viscusi, Professor of
Law and Economics, Harvard Law School.
69 Parker, 70 U Chi L Rev at 1370-75 (cited in note 10).
See OMB 2003 Report at 147 (cited in note 28) (internal citation omitted):
70

A substantial majority of the resulting estimates of VSL vary from roughly $1 million to $10
million per statistical life. There is a continuing debate within the economic and public policy analysis community on the merits of using a single VSL for all situations versus adjusting the VSL estimates to reflect the specific rule context. A variety of factors have been
identified, including whether the mortality risk involves sudden death, the fear of cancer,
and the extent to which the risk is voluntarily incurred. The consensus of EPA's recent Science Advisory Board (SAB) review of this issue was that the available literature does not
support adjustments of VSL for most of these factors.
71 See W. Kip Viscusi and Joseph E. Aldy, The Value of a Statistical Life: A CriticalReview
of Market Estimates throughout the World 26 (Related Publication 03-2 AEI-Brookings 2003),
239
(visited May 6,2004).
online at http://www.aei.brookings.org/admin/authorpdfs/page.php?id=
This median value is measured in 2000 U.S. dollars.
Parker, 70 U Chi L Rev at 1485-86 Appendix D (cited in note 10).
72
See id at 1370-73 (concluding that "the failure to incorporate necessary adjustments
73
may underestimate regulatory VSL by as much as a factor of six") (internal citation omitted). A
better response is to account for uncertainties in valuation of life by doing sensitivity analyses.
See Hahn, Government Numbers H at 60-63 (cited in note 8); Hahn, Government Numbers I at
211 (cited in note 9).
74
See EPA, An SAB Report on EPA's White Paper Valuing the Benefits of Fatal Cancer
Risk Reduction (2000), online at http://www.epa.gov/sciencel/pdfleeacfO13.pdf (visited May 6,
2004) ("[T]he Committee does not believe that the current literature supports adjustments to the
VSL for differences in age, health status, or risk aversion."). The Report rejected Professor
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may argue for adjustments that others have found to be questionable

at best, my range and estimate for the VSL are reasonable. I consider
some sensitivities below to address the concerns of those who disagree
with this assessment.
3. Analytical response to critique of benefits.
This Part provides some quantitative information on the various
critiques related to benefits derived from my more recent analysis of
the government's numbers. When final rules with zero benefits are excluded,
59 percent of the remaining 74 regulations pass a benefit-cost test

in the base case. The percentage of regulations that pass such a
test varies from 47 percent when the VSL is very low and the dis-

count rate is very high to 62 percent when the VSL is very high
and the discount rate is very low.7
Thus, over one-third of regulations fail a cost-benefit test under these

assumptions even when rules with zero benefits are excluded.76
Parker also notes that I assign a zero value to nonstandard bene-

fits, which the agency monetized.77 Including nonstandard benefits in
the calculation has very little effect on the percentage of rules that
pass a cost-benefit test-with 2 more rules, out of 106, typically passing in most scenarios."

The other main critique of the benefits in my study is that the
VSL is too low. I consider a range of $1 million to $9 million, as opposed to the $3 million to $7 million range in the original study. Again,
the change has a modest impact. The net benefits of regulation remain
positive for all scenarios. Moreover, the number of regulations passing

Revesz's study, which Parker relied on in criticizing the VSL used. Id at 6-7; Parker, 70 U Chi L
Rev at 1373 (cited in note 10) (citing Revesz's studies as requiring adjustments to the regulatory
VSL). See also EPA, Review of the Draft Analytical Plan for EPA's Second ProspectiveAnalysis-Benefits and Costs of the Clean Air Act 1990-2020: An Advisory by a Special Panel of the
Advisory Council on Clean Air Compliance Analysis 23-25 (2001), online at http://www.epa.gov/
sciencel/pdf/councila01004.pdf (visited May 6, 2004) (noting uncertainties about the proper
magnitude and even the direction of any VSL adjustments).
75 Hahn, Malik, and Dudley, Reviewing the Government's Numbers at 10 (cited in note 51).
76
This range compares to a range of 35 percent to 45 percent, with a base case value of 43
percent, when zero benefits are included. Id at 7-8. Of the forty-one rules that Parker identifies
as having zero benefits, see Parker, 70 U Chi L Rev at 1382 (cited in note 10), eleven had cost
savings that were counted in the model.
77 Parker, 70 U Chi L Rev at 1383 (cited in note 10). Nonstandard benefits are benefits that
the agency monetized, but that did not fit our standard categories for benefits Nonstandard
monetized benefits include such things as reducing ozone's effect on non-vegetation and reduced
medical expenses.
78 Hahn, Malik, and Dudley, Reviewing the Government's Numbers at 9-10 & n 16 (cited in
note 51).
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a cost-benefit test approaches 50 percent in many of the best-case
scenarios."
There are three key conclusions to be drawn from this analysis.
First, expanding the range for VSL and discount rate has a minimal
impact on the fraction of rules passing a cost-benefit test. Second, removing regulations with zero net benefits does not affect the conclusion that a significant number of regulations fail a cost-benefit test.
And third, adding nonstandard, monetized benefits has only a small
incremental impact on the results.
Costs

C.

There are two general critiques of my work on costs: that the
study excludes some unquantified costs, and that the study excludes
cost savings.Y The first is accurate; the second is not.
The study does exclude potentially important costs because it
takes agency costs as given. Agencies typically estimate direct costs,
such as the cost of a catalytic converter for a vehicle, or the cost of
putting a scrubber on a power plant. Such costs do not consider the
lost profits, for example, that may be associated with a reduction in
supply. The agency analyses also typically do not consider a number of
other factors, such as possible increases in risk associated with regulations that reduce pollution. In addition, the analyses generally ignore
economy-wide impacts and the impacts on management's time, which
can be substantial. 8'
The critics tend to miss an important implication related to the
argument that not all important costs are included. If important costs
are excluded, then it is virtually impossible to argue on the basis of
first principles that there is a clear anti-regulatory bias in cost-benefit
analyses of regulations such as those considered here. Nonetheless,
this is exactly what the critics do argue." The reality is that omitting
such costs will only tend to improve how regulations fare in a costbenefit analysis.

See id at 4,8. See also Table 2.
See Parker, 70 U Chi L Rev at 1400-02 (cited in note 10). See also McGarity, Reinventing Rationality at 127-28 (cited in note 12) (discussing the difficulty of undertaking useful regulatory economic analysis given the imperfect and incomplete cost estimates that agencies use).
81 See generally Michael Hazilla and Raymond J. Kopp, Social Cost of Environmental
Quality Regulations:A General Equilibrium Analysis, 98 J Pol Econ 853 (1990) (discussing the
importance of taking economy-wide effects into account).
82 See Parker, 70 U Chi L Rev at 1400 (cited in note 10) ("[G]overnment regulations bring
with them an array of indirect costs ... that tend to be overlooked to varying degrees in agency
RIAs and scorecards alike."). See also id at 1400-02 (suggesting that while scorecardists were not
disingenuous in omitting indirect costs, "[m]ost indirect costs ... are derivative of direct compliance costs" and that "Itlherefore, one would expect low direct costs generally to produce low indirect costs as well, yielding a low competitive and consumer impact overall").
79
80
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Parker also claims that I exclude cost savings from my analysis.?
This claim is incorrect; I include cost savings in several places. This
further refutes Parker's claim that my study has an anti-regulatory
bias. The issue of cost savings is complicated. Sometimes the savings
an agency identifies in its regulatory analysis are reasonable, but other
times such cost savings may result in the double counting of benefits.
III. IN SUPPORT OF REGULATORY SCORECARDS AND THE
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF REGULATION

This Part identifies five key contributions that regulatory scorecards and economic analysis of regulation have made to our overall
understanding of social policies and regulations. Moreover, I argue
that this kind of economic analysis is not anti-regulatory as many of
the critics claim. Finally, I suggest that the critics have not offered a viable alternative to the use of scorecards and economic analysis.
A. Scorecards and Economic Analysis Provide Useful Information
on the Effectiveness of Regulatory Policies
A well-known finding of scorecard analysis is that costeffectiveness frequently varies over a wide range for regulations and
other policy interventions. A number of studies illustrate this result.
Morrall's original table suggests that the cost per life saved varies over
several orders of magnitude." Using some of the same RIAs he examines, I derive a similar result. Morrall makes a similar finding in a recent paper building on his earlier work with Randall Lutter.? The
analysis by Tengs, Graham, and others further supports the general
finding that the cost-effectiveness of regulations and interventions,
measured in cost per life-year saved, varies widely across regulations.In the public health arena, there are also significant differences in
the cost-effectiveness of different interventions. Tengs et al find that
variations in cost-effectiveness exist between categories of life-saving

83 See id at 1361 ("For example, [Hahn] excludes cost savings from regulations because he
believes 'those savings are generally questionable."').
84 See Hahn, Government Numbers IH at 86 n 16 (cited in note 8) ("I combine cost savings
and benefits in this analysis, although economists generally believe that most estimates of cost
savings are implausible.... In my database, for example, including cost savings leads to ten regulations that save money.").
85 Morrall, 10 Regulation at 30 (cited in note 3).
86
See Hahn, Government Numbers H at 48 figure 3-3 (cited in note 8) (showing that costeffectiveness of regulations varies over time and by agency).
87 See Morrall, Saving Lives at 14 (cited in note 31), building on Randall Lutter and John F
Morrall III, Health-HealthAnalysis: A New Way to Evaluate Health and Safety Regulation, 8 J
Risk & Uncertainty 43,59 (1994).
88 See, for example, Tengs, et al, 15 Risk Analysis at 373-84 Appendix A (cited in note 4).
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interventions' Interestingly, there is also widespread use of "scorecards" in the public health literature.'O Recognizing the disparities in
cost-effectiveness among various regulations and types of regulations
is very useful for regulators, who can make budget and resource allocation decisions accordingly.
A related finding resulting from scorecards is that federal regulations aimed at reducing cancer are, on average, less cost-effective than
regulations aimed at enhancing safety. This finding first came to light
in Morrall's study, and has been further supported by later analyses.
For example, in an insightful study of Superfund, W. Kip Viscusi and
James T. Hamilton find that "[c]osts per cancer case averted [were]
very high at most of the Superfund sites in the sample," with the median cost per cancer case averted in the billions of dollars and "only 44
out of 145 sites having a cost [per] cancer case averted ...less than
$100 million."9'
Although cost-effectiveness estimates can illustrate the desirabila regulation, "[i]n principle, the best measure of desirability is
of
ity
net social benefits."' In a perceptive analysis of the costs and benefits
of different environmental policies, Freeman concludes that some
policies are economic winners and others are losers. Winners include

removing lead from gas, controlling particulate matter in air pollution,
reducing lead in drinking water, cleaning up hazardous waste sites
with the lowest cost per cancer case ,voided, and controlling
chlorofluorocarbon emissions."
Freeman's losers include mobile source air pollution control;
much waterway discharge control; and many regulations under the
Toxic Substances Control Act; the Safe Drinking Water Act; Super-9
and Rodenticide Act.
fund; and the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide
89

Id at 371:

In addition to the large variation within categories, variation in cost-effectiveness also exists
between categories .... [W]hile the median intervention described in the literature costs
$42,000 per life-year saved [ ], the median medical intervention costs $19,000/life-year [ ];
the median injury reduction intervention costs $48,000/life-year []; and the median toxin
control intervention costs $2,800,000/life-year [ ].
90 For examples of "scorecards" in the public health literature, see id at 373-84 Appendix
A; Peter J. Neumann, Sue J. Goldie, and Milton C. Weinstein, Preference-Based Measures in Economic Evaluationin Health Care,21 Ann Rev Pub Health 587,600-04 (2000).
91 James T. Hamilton and W. Kip Viscusi, Calculating Risks? The Spatial and PoliticalDimensions of HazardousWaste Policy 127 (MIT 1999).
92 Morrall, 10 Regulation at 31 (cited in note 3).
93 See Freeman, 16 J Econ Persp at 142 (cited in note 20).
94 Id. For analyses of the economic efficiency of Superfund cleanup, see James T. Hamilton
and W. Kip Viscusi, How Costly Is "Clean"? An Analysis of the Benefits and Costs of Superfund
Site Remediations,18 J Pol Analysis & Mgmt 2,2 (1999) (concluding that "many EPA Superfund
remediations fail a partial benefit-cost test"); Hamilton and Viscusi, CalculatingRisks ch 5 (cited
in note 91). For a general critique, see Paul R. Portney, Economics and the Clean Air Act, 4 J
Econ Persp 173,181 (Fall 1990).
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Freeman's analysis and identification of specific successes and failures
in policymaking are very useful in evaluating the continued utility of
these regulations, as well as possible future regulatory opportunities.
All of the quantitative studies cited here use some form of scorecard, either implicitly or explicitly, to reach conclusions about the relative effectiveness of different policy interventions. They show that
scorecards using cost-effectiveness and net benefits measures have
yielded important insights related to the effectiveness of policy in a
world of limited resources.
B.

Scorecards and Economic Analysis Set the Stage for
Smarter Regulation
Perhaps less appreciated by the critics is the fact that scorecards
and related economic analysis have been helpful in initiating smarter
regulatory policies, policies that achieve a particular social objective at
a lower overall social cost.
One well-known example is the application of market-based approaches for achieving environmental objectives." Thomas Tietenberg
highlights the potential cost savings in moving from a command-andcontrol regulatory regime to a market-based approach in his examination of the emissions trading scheme instituted by the Clean Air Act."
These savings accrue because of the knowledge of differences in estimated cost-effectiveness of various regulatory control strategies highlighted by the scorecards. By demonstrating potential cost savings, researchers have begun to influence legislators and regulators, who have
gradually moved to implement some of these ideas.
Another example is the identification of policies that may inadvertently increase health risks though they are aimed at reducing such
risks. Cass Sunstein identifies a number of such policies, including fuel
economy standards, designed to reduce environmental risks, that may
make automobiles less safe; banning the manufacture and use of asbestos that may lead companies to use more dangerous substitutes;
and efforts to remove asbestos from schools that may cause serious
risks to workers.9 When researchers and government policy analysts
quantify such risk-risk tradeoffs with scorecards, they provide an in95 See Robert W. Hahn and Robert N. Stavins, Economic Incentives for Environmental
Protection:Integrating Theory and Practice,82 Am Econ Rev 464,467 (May 1992) (pointing out
the role played by economists in formulating market-based improvements to the Clean Air Act).
96
See generally Thomas H. Tietenberg, Emissions Trading:An Exercise in Reforming Pollution Policy (Resources for the Future 1985) (discussing the Clean Air Act's emissions trading
program, and concluding that even greater cost savings could be realized upon removing barriers
to its implementation stemming from the command-and-control regulatory regime).
97
For a listing of such policies in a scorecard, see Sunstein, Risk and Reason at 140 table
6.2 (cited in note 1). For additional analyses, see generally John D. Graham and Jonathan B. Wiener, eds, Risk v& Risk: Tradeoffs in Protecting Health and the Environment (Harvard 1995).
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centive for regulatory agencies to examine the situation more closely
and implement regulations that have overall net benefits, or at least
do not result in a net increase in risk. Further, scorecards have given
rise to some innovative regulatory approaches. John Graham, in his
role as Administrator of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), implemented a policy aimed at identifying particularly
promising regulations by sending "prompt letters" to agencies suggesting implementation of such regulations." These letters are designed to
prompt agencies to act in cases in which the benefits of action seem to
outweigh the costs. Inspired by cost-benefit analysis, OIRA has asked
OSHA to consider requiring the installation of automatic external defibrillators (AEDs) in workplaces; urged the FDA to issue a final rule
requiring disclosure of the level of trans fatty acids in foods; and asked
the Department of Transportation to take steps to improve automobile safety by establishing a high-speed frontal offset crash test.9
Comparing regulations based on net benefits and costeffectiveness can also help to identify regulations or regulatory opportunities that yield a higher social return for a given expenditure -such
as saving more lives.'0° In a recent paper, Morrall identifies four such
regulatory opportunities: reducing the intake of trans fatty acids by
requiring labeling; requiring bar codes for drugs and biologic products;
promoting AEDs in the workplace; and promoting foods containing
omega-3 fatty acids.''
Scorecards Help with the Development of New Techniques to
Assess the Quality of Regulation
One underappreciated use of scorecards is their ability to provide
a systematic way of addressing the extent to which certain key variables are considered by agencies promulgating regulations."

C.

OIRA issues prompt letters to the agencies in order to encourage them to issue regulations that are more cost-effective and have higher net benefits. See Robert W. Hahn and Cass R.
01-25 AEI-Brookings
Sunstein, Regulatory Oversight Takes Exciting New Tack (Policy 2Matters
5
(visited May 6,2004) (prais2001), online at http://www.aei-brookings.org/policy/page.php?id=
ing OIRA's new practice of issuing prompt letters to agencies to encourage them to explore
regulations that might deliver benefits exceeding costs).
99 Id; OMB 2003 Report at 44 (cited in note 28).
100 There are a number of such studies. See Tengs and Graham, Opportunity Costs (cited in
note 7). See also Richard H. Chapman, et al, A Comprehensive League Table of Cost-Utility Ratios and a Sub-table of "Panel-worthy" Studies, 20 Med Dec Making 451,459-66 Appendix (2000)
(evaluating the cost utility of various medical procedures and classifying procedures as costsaving or identifying the total social cost associated with such procedures); Neumann, Goldie,
and Weinstein, 21 Ann Rev Pub Health at 602 table 4 (cited in note 90) (collecting studies evaluating the cost-benefit utility of preventative medical treatments).
101 Morrall, Saving Lives at 25 table 3 (cited in note 31).
102 See Hahn, Government Numbers IHat 36 table 3-1 (cited in note 8), for an example of a
scorecard assessing the quality and quantity of agencies' cost-benefit analyses. See generally
98
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For example, one of my studies finds a number of revealing quantitative and qualitative facts about the effectiveness of agency RIAs.
While, overall, 96 percent of the RIAs give at least a narrative description of benefits, only about 70 percent quantify those benefits, and
slightly less than half monetize those benefits. But the RIAs examined

in the study fail to provide both a best estimate and a range of quantified or monetized benefits for over 80 percent of the rules.'n Only one-

quarter of the rules in the sample quantify information on the costs
and benefits of alternatives to the regulation." This approach reveals
M

that it is possible to score both qualitative and quantitative information, and demonstrates deficiencies in the current regulatory implementation system.""
Scorecards can also be used to study the government's own reports on the costs and benefits of regulation. In a study examining the
first five OMB Reports to Congress on the costs and benefits of federal regulation, Mary Beth Muething and I find that, while a majority

of RIAs for new rules examined in the past five reports quantify some
measure of costs and benefits, benefits are monetized less frequently

than costs, and a small number of RIAs quantify neither costs nor
benefits." Scorecards assessing the costs and benefits of regulations

do a lot more than Parker suggests. They are quite versatile instruments that have offered important insights.
D.

Scorecards Help Make the Regulatory Process More Transparent
and Hold Regulators More Accountable

One of the key goals of many regulatory scholars is to make the

regulatory process more transparent. In my early research on RIAs, I

discovered that there are some problems with the presentation of inHahn, et al, 23 Harv J L & Pub Pol 859 (cited in note 45) (criticizing agencies' lack of compliance
with RIA requirements). See also Robert W. Hahn and Mary Beth Muething, The Grand Experiment in Regulatory Reporting,55 Admin L Rev 607, 613-26 (2003) (creating a scorecard for
evaluating the quality and effectiveness of OMB reports on costs and benefits of federal regulation). A similar line of research related to cost-effectiveness and public health is addressed in Peter J.Neumann, et al, The Quality of Reportingin Published Cost-UtilityAnalyses, 1976-1997, 132
Annals Internal Med 964 (2000).
103 See Hahn, et al, 23 Harv J L & Pub Pol at 866-74 (cited in note 45) ("Only 17 percent of
the rules presented both a best estimate and a range of those quantitative benefits.").
104 Id at 874.
105 In this regard, the study responds to one of the concerns raised by Parker about disregarding narrated benefits and costs.
106 Hahn and Muething, 55 Admin L Rev at 615 (cited in note 102). See generally id at 61332 (providing a "scorecard" for how well the OMB report has met congressional objectives over
the past six years, and recommending ways that the government can produce better information
on the benefits and costs of regulation). We recommend that OMB require agencies to issue a
scorecard evaluating each agency regulation, and that OMB summarize the strengths and weaknesses of regulations using this scorecard.
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formation. For example, the executive summaries frequently neither
offer a best estimate of costs and benefits nor describe the benefits in
question.
To address this problem, I helped develop a scorecard that summarizes key aspects of the regulation, such as the agency's estimates
for both quantitative and qualitative costs and benefits, and promotes
accountability by allowing OMB and others to evaluate how well
agencies are reporting information.' More recently, OIRA has
adopted a scorecard that serves a similar function."' In addition to improving regulatory transparency, scorecards can contribute to the development of innovations to hold regulators more accountable. One
such innovation is a regulatory budget, which limits the costs that a
regulatory agency can impose on consumers and business through
regulation. Scorecards tallying the costs of regulation can help provide
insights into the design of a regulatory budget, thus furthering regulatory accountability.
Eric Posner has suggested extending the idea of a regulatory
budget to include benefits.n He suggests setting up "net benefit accounts" for agencies that would operate like balance sheets, and holding regulatory agencies accountable (through rewards or punishments) for the aggregate sizes of their net benefit accounts. Agencies
would amass net benefits in their accounts only by issuing costeffective regulations; thus, the accounts would provide incentives to
minimize waste. Again, research and scorecards on the net benefits of
regulation would aid in the design of these accounts.
Scorecards Help with the Development of New Research Insights
The critics frequently fail to recognize how knowledge grows. Research has roots in earlier research, and studies of the costs and benefits of federal regulation are no exception.
Over a decade ago, we began with some preliminary estimates of
and benefits of regulation. Scholars continue to refine those
costs
the
estimates in different ways. A similar result has occurred with the costeffectiveness of regulations. The work by Tengs et al and the early
work by Morrall represent important contributions to this debate. But
E.

107 See Hahn and Sunstein, 150 U Pa L Rev at 1519-20 table 4 (cited in note 23) (proposing
a model scorecard for tallying quantitative and qualitative aspects of RIAs).
108 See OMB Draft Report at 5526 (cited in note 16) for an example of the type of scorecard
that OMB advises agencies to complete for each regulation. This scorecard summarizes primary
estimates and ranges for monetized, quantified, and qualitative costs and benefits.
109 See Eric A. Posner, When Reforming Accounting, Don't Forget Regulation (Policy Matters 02-35 AEI-Brookings 2002), online at http://www.aei-brookings.org/policy/page.php?id=104
(visited May 6, 2004) (introducing the concept of a "Net Benefit Account" that would treat the
benefits and costs of regulations as items on a balance sheet).
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perhaps they are more properly viewed as early contributions to an

important subject that continues to be refined.
The same is true of my work with RIAs. Fifteen years ago, comparing projected costs and benefits with estimates after the fact (the
ex ante/ex post issue) was not widely considered an important undertaking. Today, however, scholars and practitioners recognize its value.
In exploring this new research area, we can build on the large body of
literature that has relied on ex ante estimates to develop net benefit

calculations. "0 Further examples of scholars building on knowledge
first developed in these early works include attempts to measure the
effectiveness of the regulatory process and the ongoing debate over

the degree to which regulatory oversight is valuable.1"'
F.

Scorecards Are Not Anti-regulatory

There is nothing intrinsically anti-regulatory about the scorecards
that the critics decry. In the case of the work by Morrall, Tengs, and

Graham, one interpretation-the one drawn by Parker and Heinzerling-is that this research could help highlight policy interventions

that are not justified on the basis of a cost-benefit analysis. Another
equally plausible interpretation is that such research helps highlight

ways in which society can derive a better return on its regulatory investment. Similarly, cost-benefit analysis can be used to reform or
eliminate regulations, but it can also be used to point out areas where

more regulation might be needed. In short, the tools of economic
analysis, and scorecards in particular, are not inherently pro- or antiregulatory. The tools, if used judiciously, can help to strike an appropriate balance.

110 See Si Kyung Seong and John Mendeloff, Assessing the Accuracy of OSHA's Projections
of the Benefits of New Safety Standards 23-24 tables II, III (Regulatory Analysis 03-8 AEIBrookings 2003), online at http://www.aei-brookings.org/publications/abstract.php?pid=357 (visited May 6, 2004) (comparing ex ante estimates of costs and benefits with ex post data of actual
costs and benefits, and determining that OSHA consistently overestimates benefits).
111 See Scott Farrow, Improving Regulatory Performance:Does Executive Office Oversight
Matter? (AEI-Brookings 2000), online at http://www.aei-brookings.org/publications/related/
oversight.pdf (visited May 6, 2004) (concluding that OIRA oversight has resulted in rejecting
some economically inefficient regulations, but has not improved cost-effectiveness of regulations
implemented). My own work suggests that cost-effectiveness of regulations has become neither
significantly better nor worse over time. See Hahn, Government Numbers 11 at 52-53 (cited in
note 8) ("[Tlhe cost-effectiveness of regulations as a function of time does not follow any obvious pattern.... [T]he benefit-cost ratios of regulations do not vary systematically over time.").
Both of these works illustrate how the data initially developed by Morrall and others can be applied in different contexts. See also W. Kip Viscusi, Risk by Choice: Regulating Health and Safety
in the Workplace 136-55 (Harvard 1983) (discussing agencies' risk regulation and the ineffectiveness thereof).
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What's the Alternative?

Some critics claim that cost-benefit analysis is an "atomistic" or
"reductionist" approach."' They argue that breaking a problem down
into its component parts, using cost-benefit analysis as typically applied, can result in the loss of important information"3 and answers
that defy common sense.14
Ackerman and Heinzerling propose, as an alternative, using a
"holistic" approach for analyzing costs and benefits, where costs as a
whole and benefits as a whole are considered together-but are not

forced to be expressed in the same units.'
Ackerman and Heinzerling's critique of cost-benefit analysis as
an analytical tool falls short on several counts. First, they do not acknowledge many advantages offered by cost-benefit analysis. "' For example, cost-benefit analysis attempts to aggregate incremental benefits and costs to develop a measure, albeit an imperfect one, of the

overall "net benefits" of a regulatory decision."' When done judiciously, cost-benefit analysis also considers whether other alternatives

can result in higher levels of net benefits. In addition, when data are
available, such analysis can provide assessments of economic impacts
on particular subgroups within a population, thus assessing distributional or equity issues. It therefore provides a useful device for helping

to reach an informed judgment about the relative merits of a policy.
Second, the fact that cost-benefit analysis can defy common sense
is not necessarily a problem. Indeed, in many cases, it is a strength. 1
112 Frank Ackerman and Lisa Heinzerling, Priceless: On Knowing the Price of Everything
and the Value of Nothing 211 (New Press 2004). For a concise review of Priceless,see Cass R.
Sunstein, Your Money or Your Life, New Republic 27 (Mar 15,2004).
113 Ackerman and Heinzerling, Priceless at 212 (cited in note 112). The basic argument is
not new. See, for example, Lester B. Lave, The Strategy of Social Regulation: Decision Frameworks for Policy (Brookings 1981). See also Lester B. Lave, Benefit-Cost Analysis: Do the Benefits Exceed the Costs?, in Hahn, ed, Risk Costs; and Lives Saved 104, 129 (cited in note 7) ("We
need to spend more time identifying attributes and must be more careful not to eliminate important attributes.").
114 See Ackerman and Heinzerling, Pricelessat 211-12 (cited in note 112).
115 See id at 212.
116 This is true, even though Ackerman and Heinzerling are careful to acknowledge that
"analysis of costs and benefits, in lowercase letters, is an essential part of any systematic thought
about public policy, and has always been involved in government decision making." Id at 211. Although they agree that weighing costs and benefits is critical, they fail to see the specific advantages of cost-benefit analysis.
117 Net benefits are typically defined as the difference between incremental benefits and incremental costs. Moreover, as is well known, virtually all measures of net benefits have problems
because of the difficulty of making welfare comparisons across individuals. See generally Kenneth J. Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values (John Wiley & Sons 1951).
118 For a discussion of the importance of cost-benefit analysis as a tool to identify ways of
protecting health, and extending lives, that ordinary intuition would neglect, see generally Sunstein, Risk and Reason (cited in note 1).

2004]

Economic Analysis of Regulation

1049

Take the example of arsenic. The EPA's analysis of this issue suggested
that regulation of arsenic in drinking water to the most stringent of
the contemplated standards would not pass a cost-benefit test.' 9 Or
stated another way, the cost per statistical life saved under the most

stringent arsenic standard appeared to be substantially higher than the
benefits as measured by most plausible measures of willingness to
pay." Such information is useful for a decisionmaker, even if she decides to regulate arsenic to that stringent standard.
Third, contrary to what Ackerman and Heinzerling say, costbenefit analysis does not require that costs and benefits be expressed
in the same units or that agencies monetize benefits that may not be
quantifiable. 2' Guidelines for cost-benefit analysis typically encourage
analysts to monetize costs and benefits to the maximum extent reasonable. That does not mean, however, that other forms of analysis,
such as cost-effectiveness analysis or risk-risk analysis should not be
considered." They should be considered along with cost-benefit analysis.

Fourth, Ackerman and Heinzerling's alternative to weighing costs
and benefits, a "holistic" approach, appears to require an implicit acceptance of a cost-benefit framework. Indeed, Ackerman and Heinzerling suggest that the two approaches would yield the same answer
with full information. ' If the two approaches yield the same answer
with full information, it suggests that the authors would embrace the
analytical framework. But with partial information -the situation that
119 See EPA, Arsenic in Drinking Water Rule: Economic Analysis Exhibit 1-3 at 1-6 (Dee
2000) (detailing the net benefits and benefit-cost ratios of each regulatory option), online at
http://www.epa.gov/safewater/ars/econ-analysis.pdf (visited May 29, 2004). This table shows that
net benefits are significantly negative at the most stringent arsenic standard considered, three
micrograms per liter. But consider Ackerman and Heinzerling, Priceless at 212 (cited in note
112) (suggesting that EPA's conclusion "that people would not be willing to pay the modest additional amount for the strictest possible level of arsenic regulation" defies common sense).
120 Ackerman and Heinzerling dispute the EPA's conclusion by using a different willingness
to pay measure, the price of bottled water. See Ackerman and Heinzerling, Pricelessat 214 (cited
in note 112) ("A holistic approach to the arsenic problem ... encourages us to ask whether it is
worth the price of one or two bottles of water per person per year to ensure that everyone has
tap water with the lowest possible level of arsenic. The atomistic approach sends us back to the
mall to ask people about the monetary value of avoiding a nonfatal case of bladder cancer.").
121 There are many different views of how cost-benefit analysis should be implemented. See,
for example, Kenneth J. Arrow, et al, Benefit-CostAnalysis in Environmental,Health, and Safety
Regulation: A Statement of Principles 8 ("Not all impacts of a decision can be quantified or expressed in dollar terms Care should be taken to assure that quantitative factors do not
dominate important qualitative factors in decisionmaking.") (AEI 1996), online at
http://www.aei-brookings.org/admin/authorpdfs/page.php?id=203 (visited May 31,2004). See also
Sunstein, Risk and Reason at 123-24 (cited in note 1).
122 See Lave, The Strategy of Social Regulation at 8-28 (cited in note 113). See also Lave,
Benefit-Cost Analysis at 127 (cited in note 113) (suggesting that "[m]any issues can be handled
with simpler frameworks, such as 'no-risk,' 'technology-based standards,' or 'cost-effectiveness"').
123 See Ackerman and Heinzerling, Pricelessat 214 (cited in note 112).
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is most relevant for real world problems-the only conceptual
changes are the inclusion of uncertainty and accounting for diverse effects without quantifying them. That means one should be careful to
reflect those uncertainties and account for qualitative factors in the
underlying analysis.'24 It does not generally imply that the analysis itself should not be done. A decisionmaker can often benefit from having estimates of the distribution of monetary benefits and costs, along
with other relevant information.
Fifth, Ackerman and Heinzerling never satisfactorily explain why
some benefits are intrinsically "priceless," other than to suggest that
they are not traded in markets.2 1 The fact that it may be difficult to
quantify or monetize certain incremental benefits, such as reducing
mercury emissions, does not make them priceless. It merely means
that the value that people place on them is uncertain.
Sixth, the holistic approach does not provide guidance on how
much to regulate. It does not, for example, help in setting the standard
for particulate matter. The authors would appear to concede as much,
stating that a "holistic assessment of one's options in the market leads
to an either-or-choice: to buy or not to buy.' ' 26 But even here, the holistic approach falls short. The problem is that Ackerman and Heinzerling do not offer an approach to weigh things that are priceless. If
some things are priceless, making a buy or not-buy choice is extremely
difficult. Should priceless values trump all other benefits? Does one
value a statistical life today more than one tomorrow? How does one
account for the risk-risk tradeoffs between the present and future?
Ackerman and Heinzerling fail to answer these difficult but critical
questions.
On the question of how much to buy, the authors offer three additional principles: following moral imperatives rather than cost comparisons; adopting a precautionary approach; and promoting fairness. ' The authors endorse a holistic approach for weighing costs and
benefits in making policy, but then they add other principles that
should be factored into a decision.
This leads to a natural question. If one is indeed taking a holistic
approach to costs and benefits, why are additional principles needed
124 See Sunstein, Risk and Reason at 108 (cited in note 1) ("The risk that cost-benefit analysis will drown out relevant variables is not a reason to abandon the analysis, but to take steps to
ensure against any such effect.").
125 See Ackerman and Heinzerling, Pricelessat 8-9 (cited in note 112) (stating that "we are
in the realm of the priceless" when "market values tell us little about the social values at stake");
id at 207 ("The imperatives of protecting human life, health, and the natural world around us,
and ensuring equitable treatment of rich and poor, and of present and future generations, are not
sold in markets and cannot be assigned meaningful prices.").
126 Id at 213.
127 See id at 208-10.
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to guide decisionmaking? In setting up these principles for decisionmaking, Ackerman and Heinzerling seem to suggest that their holistic
approach may not be a sufficient basis for reaching a decision. But if
their holistic approach is not sufficient, then their approach is by definition not holistic.
Even if one accepts these principles, they do not provide a very
clear basis for making decisions. Balancing these potentially competing principles would mean a very wide range of decisions could be justified in practice.' Following moral imperatives may or may not be
consistent with a precautionary "no risk" principle, depending on how
these principles are applied. Furthermore, there is no guarantee that
following a precautionary approach or moral imperatives would necessarily be consistent with a holistic approach or fairness concerns in
determining policy. Consider a stylized example. A holistic approach
to analyzing costs and benefits of climate change could imply a $20 tax
per ton of carbon emitted. A precautionary approach could involve a
$100 tax per ton, or paralyze policymaking due to a desire to take precautions against both the risks of carbon and the risks of the carbon
tax itself.12Ackerman and Heinzerling neglect these pitfalls of the precautionary principle. Following a moral imperative, assuming we know
which one to follow, might yield a $200 tax per ton, or may not yield a
clear policy." Fairness concerns could require subsidizing some groups
that have to pay the tax. What's a poor policymaker to do?13"'
Finally, Ackerman and Heinzerling anticipate objections to their
"alternative" by pointing out that many important decisions are made
on the basis of rights and principles, not costs and benefits, and that
major resource allocation decisions are often made without considering costs.'32 The fact that many of the government's decisions are made
without regard to costs does not mean that cost-benefit analysis is not
128 Depending on the weights you assign to different principles, you could end up with different policy outcomes.
129 See Sunstein, Risk and Reason at 103--04 (cited in note 1):

In real-world controversies, a failure to regulate will run afoul of the precautionary principle because potential risks are involved. But regulation itself will cause potential risks, and
hence run afoul of the precautionary principle too; and the same is true for every step in between. Hence the precautionary principle, taken for all that it is worth, is literally paralyzing. It bans every step, including inaction itself
130 See Cass R. Sunstein, Moral Heuristics 14 (draft Mar 2003) (discussing how moral heuristics can lead to absurd moral judgments and systematic errors in risk regulation), online at
http://ssrn.com/abstractid=387941 (visited May 30,2004).
131 Of course, a decisionmaker could use these principles, but the range of optimal outcomes using these criteria could be extraordinarily wide. This is true even when compared with
an approach that maximizes net benefits subject to a constraint related to fairness.
132 See Ackerman and Heinzerling, Priceless at 213 (cited in note 112). But see Stephen
Holmes and Cass R. Sunstein, The Cost of Rights: Why Liberty Depends on Taxes (Norton 1999)
(arguing that rights are not moral absolutes but are based on costs).

1052

The University of Chicago Law Review

[71:1021

valuable for decisionmaking."' Indeed, this is another reason for applying the construct more broadly in areas ranging from homeland security to privacy.
Another suggested alternative from the legal critic camp is to
analyze regulation on a case-by-case basis.' 3' By and large, I think
economists would be supportive of this approach. If the government is
making a decision about a particular regulation, it makes sense to
weigh the benefits and costs of that regulation. But what if the government or researchers are trying to assess the effectiveness of a program like Superfund? ' In such cases, studying regulations only on a
case-by-case basis would not suffice. In some cases there is no realistic
alternative to measuring the impact of multiple regulations or statutes
when the aim is to assess the effectiveness of a program.
In the words of one Nobel Laureate economist, George Stigler,
"it takes a theory to beat a theory.''37 The critics have failed to offer
such a "theory." Until they do, we should continue with the current
approach to analyzing social regulation, where cost-benefit analysis is

supposed to play an important role, and remain open to changes in
this analysis when they would furnish new insights.3
CONCLUSION

Scholars have made much progress over the past thirty years in
understanding the economic impact of social regulation. In no small
part, that progress is due to efforts to systematize knowledge, includ-

ing the use of regulatory scorecards.
133 Indeed, examples of unsuccessful decisions where cost-benefit analysis was barred show
how valuable cost-benefit analysis can be. See Freeman, 16 J Econ Persp at 142 (cited in note 20)
(noting that several major regulations barred from cost-benefit balancing turned out to be "losers," where costs exceeded benefits).
134 Cost-benefit analysis could, for example, illustrate the extent to which homeland security
regulations constrain civil liberties. Although quantifying civil liberties is difficult, cost-benefit
analysis could provide valuable insights in this area.
135 See Parker, 70 U Chi L Rev at 1413 (cited in note 10). See also Shapiro and Glicksman,
Risk Regulation at Risk at 79 (cited in note 29) (suggesting that a "more relevant consideration
for policy purposes ... is the impact of individual regulations").
136 See Freeman, 16 J Econ Persp at 141 (cited in note 20) (noting that Hamilton and Viscusi's 1999 study of 145 Superfund sites for which data are available indicated that about 70 percent of the sites have estimated costs per case greater than $112 million, several orders of magnitude greater than the cost per cancer case avoided, which is about $3.5 million).
137 George J. Stigler, Nobel Memorial Lecture: The Process and Progressof Economics 67
(Dec 8, 1982), online at http://www.nobel.se/economicsllaureates/1982/stigler-lecture.pdf (visited
June 8, 2004), reprinted in Kurt R. Leube and Thomas Gale Moore, eds, The Essence of Stigler
134, 145 (Hoover 1986) ("The main reason for the considerable acceptance of the approach is
that fundamental rule of scientific combat: it takes a theory to beat a theory.").
138 I am not saying here that cost-benefit analysis should be the only factor informing the
decision to pursue a policy. I am saying that, done well, it can serve as a very useful input in the
decisionmaking process.
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This Article has argued that scorecards and economic analysis
have made important contributions to the study of social regulation.
First, these tools illustrate that the cost-effectiveness of government
regulations can vary substantially. Second, they show that government
regulation is inefficient in the sense that it is possible to get more for
less, most notably in areas of environmental quality and life-saving investments. Third, they demonstrate that a significant fraction of regulations are likely to fail a cost-benefit test based on the government's
numbers, and a significant fraction are likely to pass. Finally, they illustrate that there are serious problems with the quality of cost-benefit
analyses done by the government in the area of social regulation.
The main studies that motivate this work have come under intense scrutiny by the critics. Indeed, Parker has gone so far as to suggest that these studies are "shoddy.'. 9 There are many ways to judge
research, and the critics are certainly entitled to their opinions. I
would like to offer an alternative viewpoint. Each of the studies to
which Parker refers broke new ground. They should not be viewed as
the last word on the subject, but rather as closer to the first word, the
beginning of a dialogue on the efficacy and cost-efficiency of regulations, a dialogue that already has resulted in great advances in understanding and implementing regulations.
In judging these studies, one should ask several questions. First,
do the studies ask important questions? I think even the critics would
agree that they do. Indeed, each study asks a variant of a very important question: is it possible for society to get a higher return on its investment in social regulation?
Second, do these studies help shed light on a new research area?
Again I think the answer is yes. Morrall's was the first study to suggest
that cost-effectiveness of life-saving interventions could vary significantly across regulations. Tengs et al produced the first study to provide a comprehensive and accessible dataset on the estimated costs
and effectiveness of life-saving interventions. Tengs and Graham were
the first authors to assess systematically the gains from changing the
mix of life-saving interventions in the United States. My study was the
first to provide a comprehensive analysis of the economic information
contained in government regulatory analyses.
Third, do these studies offer a reasonable approach and methodology for addressing the problem they define? While I think one can
find defects in each of the analyses, each offers a reasonable and novel
approach to the issues it addresses.
The critics have made a modest contribution to this area of study
by highlighting some of the current and past deficiencies, but more
139

Richard W. Parker, Gradingthe Government (draft Feb 2003) (on file with author).
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needs to be done. Their mode of analysis tends to be critical of particular studies or groups of studies. Rather than simply providing critiques of particular papers, they may want to consider doing their own
analyses of these issues. The solution to the legitimate concerns raised
by the critics is not to eliminate quantitative analysis altogether, but to
gain a deeper understanding of its strengths and weaknesses, and to
use it wisely.
Critics of regulatory scorecards and the economic analyses of social regulation have overplayed their hand. In particular, they have
overstated the extent to which cost-benefit analysis and other quantitative tools are anti-regulatory. In principle, there is absolutely nothing
anti-regulatory about these tools. In practice, it is a stretch to suggest
that the application of these tools in the main studies has been antiregulatory. Moreover, just because politicians use data in certain ways
does not mean the underlying research is anti-regulatory.
The critics need to appreciate that social regulation is neither intrinsically good nor bad. There are situations in which quantitative
cost-benefit analysis and cost-effectiveness analysis will support regulations as they are and other situations in which these methods will
suggest the need to change or eliminate regulation. Quantitative tools
provide a useful method for systematically assessing some of the details as well as the bigger picture.
One of the most intriguing features of Parker's critique of scorecards is what he leaves out. He does not critique, for example, the fine
work that economists have done on the benefits of environmental
regulation or in assessing whether regulatory analyses cover important categories, such as quantifying benefits and costs. Yet, this work
falls within the broad domain of scorecards. Instead, the focus of many
critics has been on results that do not appear to serve their political
ends, which seem to include giving agency regulators a larger say in
decisionmaking.
At the end of the day, the critics have expended a great deal of
energy in trying to discredit certain academics and their work. That
they have made a valiant effort cannot be denied. They have shown
that scholars should be careful in interpreting the findings from particular studies and that there are likely to be some mistakes in all studies with many numbers. But they have failed to show why scorecards
or economic analysis of regulation should be abandoned. And they
have failed to see how scorecards, in particular, have provided scholars
and practitioners with useful insights into the policy process. Maybe
they should consider abandoning the quest to banish scorecards that
do not suit their needs and accept that economic analysis should be an
integral part of the regulatory policymaking process.

